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ABSTRACT 
 
Differences between Core and Animal Reminder Disgust Elicitation on a Core 
Disgust Avoidance Task—A Replication with Modification 
 
Schumann, Matthew E., M.A. Minnesota State University, Mankato, 2013. 
 
Compred to other emotions, there has been a lack of research on disgust as it relates to 
psychopathology. Of the extant research, disgust has been shown to be implicated in 
various anxiety disorders and consist of three domains: core, animal-reminder, and 
contamination disgust. There is evidence that these domains are correlated with disgust-
relevant anxiety disorders, and this sensitivity to specific disgust domains have different 
topographical presentations. This study aims to determine if priming participants with 
different domain-specific videos (core, animal-reminder, neutral) and then completing a 
disgust-related behavioral avoidance task that is specific to the core domain, will lead to 
greater behavioral avoidance to the disgust-related task.  The results indicate that those 
who were exposed to a Domain-Congruent video exhibited greater avoidance and self-
reported disgust than those who were exposed to the Domain-Incongruent and Neutral 
videos.  These findings suggest it may be appropriate to  add disgust to the exposure 
paradigm. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION AND REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
The Role of Disgust in Anxiety Disorders 
 Despite being one of the primal human emotions, disgust has been the least 
researched compared to other emotions such as sadness, anger, and fear (Olatunji & 
McKay, 2009). Yet, this trend has been changing. Over the past 20 years, the role of 
disgust in psychopathology has been increasingly examined in empirical literature 
(Mason & Richardson, 2012; Olatunji, Lohr, Smits, Sawchuk, & Patten, 2009).  
Specifically, disgust has been shown to contribute to the etiology and maintenance of 
anxiety disorders (Olatunji & McKay, 2009). The expression and sensitivity to disgust 
has been shown to contribute to behavioral avoidance and distress above and beyond fear 
alone (Olatunji et al., 2009). While it has been assumed that fear is the primary emotion 
linked to anxiety disorders, research has shown that disgust and its presentation of 
anxiety, albeit similar to fear, has evolutionary and functional differences that contribute 
anxiety (Curtis & Brian, 2001; Cisler, Olatunji, & Lohr, 2009). 
Evolutionary Functions of Disgust Avoidance 
 Though not traditionally conceptualized as contributing to functions of avoidance 
in anxiety disorders, disgust has been shown to characterize avoidance topographically 
similar to fear (Woody & Teachman, 2000). Yet this similar avoidance topography may 
lead to the vastly different presentations in anxiety, and researchers are beginning to 
understand a variety of disgust-related anxiety disorders (Olatunji & McKay, 2009). 
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Thus, it is important to discriminate disgust’s unique function of avoidance. To do so, 
one must define disgust in an evolutionary context. 
 It has taken 150 years of refining definitions to understand disgust. Darwin 
(1872/1998) first defined the evolutionary function of disgust as a revulsion response to 
unsavory foods, however. Current conceptualizations of disgust define disgust as a 
complex function serving to protect the self from physical and psychological harm 
(Woody & Teachman, 2000). Although this function is similar to fear, the contexts under 
which the defense mechanism operates are different.  Fear serves to protect oneself from 
situations in which physical harm could occur (Ware, Jain, Burgess, & Davey, 1994; 
Woody & Teachman, 2000).  Humans avoid strangers, animals that can inflict serious 
harm (i.e., snakes, sharks), small spaces, heights, and the dark to ensure that physical 
harm or death will not occur. Thus, staying away from dark places where one can be 
harmed, avoiding falling from high places, suffocating in small, enclosed spaces or being 
bitten by a poisonous spider is evolutionarily adaptive for survival. 
 Like fear, the primary function of disgust is to ensure survival, yet disgust has 
shown to differentiate from fear along dimensions of behavioral intentions, appraisal, and 
physiological responses (Cisler et al., 2008). Disgust serves as an adaptive function to 
avoid oral incorporation or contact with noxious or contaminated stimuli (Ware, Jain, 
Burgess, & Davey, 1994). One can think of disgust as the guardian of the body. Disgust 
causes responses that ensure that the body does not ingest things that could cause bodily 
harm (i.e., rotten or decayed food, spoiled or contaminated beverages), and ensures 
avoidance of body products (e.g., blood, feces, vomit) or contaminated (e.g., dead 
animals, violations of the body envelope) or potentially contaminated stimuli (e.g., 
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contact with a used tissue) that may cause illness. Thus, avoiding unsanitary stimuli, an 
organism also avoids illness, infection, and possibly death.  
 The physiological reactions to disgust include feelings of nausea, salvation, and 
facials reactions (wrinkling of eyes and nose, and reaction of the lips) to defend the body 
from offensive stimuli or remove a contaminated stimulus that has been ingested (Rozin, 
Haidt, & McCauley., 2008).  The differences between fear and disgust are evident in the 
sympathetic and parasympathetic nervous system activity. Typically, fear heightens 
activity in preparation for fight or flight, and disgust suspends activity (Phillips, Fahy, 
David, & Senior, 1998). 
 Disgust also encompasses aspects of the self that is not necessarily associated 
with the body. Rozin and colleagues (2008) proposed that disgust has an “evolutionary 
pathway” that has allowed this emotion to evolve to the protector of the social self as 
well. The authors state that this pathway has allowed humans to protect themselves from 
more complex disgust elicitors that include stimuli that are considered morally or 
culturally repugnant. Moral or cultural disgust elicitors include culturally determined 
sexually inappropriate acts (i.e., rape, incest, bestiality, and homosexuality), vulgarity, 
and various forms of interpersonal disgust (i.e., obesity and racism).  It is theorized that 
humans avoid these situations or individuals considered culturally uncommon or 
unhealthy to maintain social order and ensure reproduction of our species (Curtis & 
Biran, 2008). 
Disgust in Anxiety Disorders and Other Psychopathology 
 Fear is considered the chief emotion in phobias and other anxiety disorders. Yet, 
recent literature has shown that in blood-injection-injury phobia (BII), small animal 
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phobia, and contamination-related obsessive compulsive disorder (OCD) disgust 
sensitivity has been a better predictor of distressing symptoms of anxiety compared to 
fear in nonclinical controls (Olatunji & McKay, 2009; Cisler et al., 2009; Olatunji, Lohr, 
Sawchuk, & Westendorf, 2005). The next few sections will focus on research that has 
shown disgust to be a key contributor to onset and maintenance of anxiety disorders and 
other psychopathology. 
 Blood-Injection-Injury Phobia. There has been considerable empirical interest 
in the mediating roles of fear and disgust in phobic responding of BII (Koch, 2002; 
Olatunji & McKay, 2009; Olatunji et al, 2009). Viar and colleagues (2010) attempted to 
determine differences in levels of anxiety and disgust for BII individuals and nonfearful 
participants prior to blood donation. Pre-donation levels of anxiety and disgust was 
significantly higher for BII individuals compared to nonfearful participants, and disgust 
sensitivity served as a predictors of vasovagal syncope (fainting) symptoms. These results 
show that disgust is a key component to the avoidance of BII-relevant stimuli and is 
consistent with previous research that found that highly disgusted individuals report 
significantly more fainting symptoms compared to individuals experiencing no disgust 
during injection (Viar, et al., 2010; Deacon & Abramowitz, 2006).  
 Research has also looked at behavioral avoidance compared to levels of fear and 
disgust (Koch, O’Neil, Sawchuk, & Connolly, 2002). Koch and colleagues had BII 
clinical and nonclinical participants complete a variety of disgust-related behavioral 
avoidance tasks (BATs). The researchers found that BII individuals expressed 
significantly greater fear and disgust toward phobia-relevant pictures and BAT stimuli 
(mutilation, touching bloody gauze, touching a severed deer leg) with disgust levels being 
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higher than that of fear. Olatunji and colleagues (2009) wanted to determine the 
differences between fear sensitivity and disgust sensitivity between a clinical sample of 
individuals with BII phobia and nonclinical controls.  The researchers discovered that BII 
individuals had higher disgust sensitivity than nonclinical controls before and after 
viewing stimuli related to their fears (i.e., body envelope violations, blood, syringes). 
Fear sensitivity, conversely, was only slightly higher for the BII individuals than control. 
Thus, disgust sensitivity was able to differentiate between groups better than fear 
sensitivity. 
 Small Animal Phobia. Disgust has been shown to be a key component in small 
animal phobia, more specifically its role in spider phobia. Olatunji and Deacon (2008) 
found that participants identified as having high small animal phobia reported greater 
levels of disgust compared to nonfearful participant when exposed to a realistic-looking, 
but fake, tarantula (Olatunji & Deacon, 2008). Disgust has also been shown to lead to 
behavioral avoidance of animal phobic stimuli.  Woody, McLean, and Klassen (2005) 
examined disgust’s motivating factors in avoidance of spider-related stimuli through 
BATs comparing a tarantula, a pen that had come in contact with the spider, and a clean 
pen. Participants identified as having high spider phobia and low spider phobias were 
asked to rate their levels of disgust and fear before, during, and after completing one of 
the BATs.   The results found that individuals with high spider fear reported significantly 
higher levels of disgust and anxiety than low spider fear participants, and peak disgust 
was the best predictor of avoidance on the spider and “contaminated” pen BATs. Further 
research has supported the role of disgust in behavioral avoidance and development of 
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small animal phobia (Davey & Marzillier, 2009;  Muris, Jorg, Birgit, & de Vries, 2012; 
Vernon & Berenbaum; 2008). 
 The Disease-avoidance model has attempted explained why humans tend to fear 
animals that should cause little threat (Matchett & Davey, 1991).  The common phobias 
of rats, snakes, insects, and spiders are all animals that humans have little threat of attack, 
however the disease-avoidance model proposes that we fear and avoid these relatively 
harmless animals because they are connected to disease and contamination, which evoke 
feelings of disgust. Empirical support for the role of disgust and fear in this model were 
discovered by Ware, Jain, Burgess, and Davey (1994). The researchers found that animal 
fears can be separated into two distinct factors, those that are disgust-relevant and those 
that are fear relevant. Animals that belong to the disgust-relevant include slugs, maggots, 
frogs, bats, snakes, and spiders, and animals that belong to the fear-relevant factor 
include lions, bears, tigers, and sharks. Ware and colleagues tested the factor analysis 
further and found that there is a significant correlation between levels of disgust and 
disgust-relevant animal phobias, and that individual difference in disgust levels 
accounted for a significant amount of variance in fears of animals in the disgust-relevant 
factor. 
 Contamination-Related Obsessive Compulsive Disorder. Fear of 
contamination, a common concern in those with OCD, has been shown to have a more 
complex relationship with disgust than small animal phobia and BII. While the 
relationship between disgust aversion of potential sources of contamination or injection 
seems intuitive and has been supported (see reviews in Olatunji et al., 2005, Olatunji & 
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McKay, 2009), the relationship has seen mixed results in the literature (Connolly et al, 
2009).  
 Muris and colleagues (2000) examined the role of disgust and different 
psychopathology in a sample of college students. The results showed that OCD 
symptoms, specifically cleaning concerns, were significantly related to disgust. The 
researchers concluded that alleviating disgust through cleaning behaviors negatively 
reinforce the symptoms of OCD. Mancini, Gregnani, and D’Olimpio (2001) also found 
strong associations between disgust and OCD symptoms in a nonclinical sample. The 
authors found that washing and checking behaviors uniquely predicted levels of disgust. 
Deacon and Olatunji (2007) exposed high and low contamination fearing individuals to 
three BATs that consisted of a used comb, a cookie on the floor, and a bedpan filled with 
toilet water.  They found that levels of disgust were significantly associated with anxious 
and avoidant responding on the BATs demonstrating a robust association with 
contamination concerns associated with individuals with OCD. These results have been 
supported with implicit measures of disgust sensitivity as well (Nicholson & Barnes-
Holmes, 2012). 
 Contradictory to behavioral research, research on the cognitive processes have 
shown that there is a covariation bias in contamination fear related to fear specific and 
disgust specific emotions. Connolly and colleagues (2009) examined this covariation bias 
associated with contamination stimuli in high contamination fear and low contamination 
fear individuals.  The results revealed that group differences could be found for specific 
bias toward the over-estimation of fear with the high contamination fearful group 
exhibited greater bias. Therefore, the high fearful group would overestimate the 
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probability of exposure to contamination, but would not overestimate feelings of disgust 
when exposed a contagion. Thus, fear is a greater predictor of cognitive symptoms of 
OCD than disgust.  These results regarding disgust and fear, however, do not necessarily 
have to be mutually exclusive. The complex relationship of OCD symptoms and 
emotions may be split along cognitive and behavioral lines. With greater association of 
the cognitive symptoms of OCD with fear and the behavioral symptoms associated with 
disgust. Recent research examining cognitive and behavioral components of OCD has 
supported this theory (Thorpe et al., 2011). 
 Other Psychopathology. The role of disgust in other psychopathology has been 
limited in empirical research, but has been shown to be implicated in a variety of 
disorders.  Research has shown advanced forms of disgust (moral and cultural) to be 
implicated in eating disorders (Griffiths & Troop, 2006), dental anxiety (Mercklebach et 
al., 1999), sexual dysfunction (de Jong, 2007), post-traumatic stress disorder (Bomyea & 
Amir, 2012), and even schizophrenia (Schiele, 2003). While relationships for these 
disorders and disgust are tenuous at best, the paucity of research involving other 
psychopathology continues to find associations. The abstract nature of these connections 
is much more difficult to study, and the current study will focus on disgust and 
psychopathology with strong empirical support.  
Disgust Domains 
 Measures of disgust have undergone substantial refinement over the past four 
decades. Through this refinement, the construct of disgust sensitivity has been 
determined to be chief dependent measure in disgust research.  Disgust sensitivity is the 
predisposition to experience disgust in response to a wide array of aversive stimuli (de 
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Jong & Merckelbach, 1998). Thus, to conceptualize and understand individual 
differences of disgust, how much disgust someone will feel or experience, one must 
determine disgust sensitivity. 
 Disgust Scale. Building upon Rozin, Fallon, and Mandell’s original 
conceptualization of disgust sensitivity in the context of contaminated foods (see the 
Disgust and Contamination Sensitivity Questionnaire, 1984), Haidt, McCauley, and 
Rozin (1994) developed The Disgust Scale (DS) to measure a broader range of disgust 
elicitors. The broader contextual applicationof the DS has made it possible to investigate 
various domains of disgust. The purpose of the DS is to measure trait disgust as stable 
differences among individuals in anticipation of repugnant stimuli (Olatunji, et al., 2007). 
Due to the specific domain measures, compared to other measures of disgust sensitivity 
(i.e., The Disgust Emotion Scale, Disgust Propensity and Sensitivity Scale, and the 
Looming of Disgust Scale) the DS is the most widely used in the study of anxiety 
disorders (Olatunji & Sawchuk, 2005). 
  Through factor analysis, Haidt and colleagues (1994) found that disgust 
sensitivity can be measured with 32 questions across eight domains. The first seven 
domains focus on disgust elicitors and include: food (spoiled/fouled or is culturally 
unacceptable, e.g., eating monkey meat, drinking spoiled milk), animals (slimy or living 
dirty conditions, e.g., seeing a rat or maggots), body products (e.g., smelling body odors, 
seeing feces in a toilet, hearing someone clear mucus out of their throat), body envelope 
violations (injury or mutilation of the body, e.g., missing an eye, seeing exposed organs, 
severed limbs), death (e.g., encountering dead bodies or walking through graveyards), sex 
(acts or sexually deviant behavior, e.g., inflating a condom, incest), and hygiene 
10 
 
(unsanitary conditions or violations of culturally expected hygiene practices, e.g., 
washing underwear only once a week, touching a toilet seat). Sympathetic magic, the 
final domain, is conceptual in nature. Disgust concepts included in this domain involve 
stimuli without infectious qualities that resemble contaminants (e.g., candy shaped like 
dog feces) or were once in contact with contaminants (e.g., drinking out of a cup of a 
previously sick person), this domain is named sympathetic magic because the evaluator 
must infer that the stimuli were magically contaminated or made disgusting in some way. 
 The DS is not without its psychometric limitations, and these shortcomings are 
outlined in the literature (Olatunji et al., 2007; Olatunji & McKay, 2009).  First, the sex 
domain has been found to have the lowest correlation among DS domains and anxiety 
pathology (Olatunji, et al., 2007). This demonstrates that the sex domain (a more abstract 
form of disgust) may functionally be different than the other domains in anxiety etiology. 
While there is evidence for convergent validity of the DS in anxiety research, there are 
poor reliability estimates for each of the individual domains determined from two 
independent samples (from food, α=.34 to Envelope Violations, α=.63; Quigley et al., 
1997; Druschel & Sherman, 1999). Further research has shown that total scores on the 
DS report adequate internal consistency, but the internal consistencies of the 8 DS 
subscales continue to be problematic (all eight below α=.43; Tolin, Woods, & 
Abramowitz, 2006). 
 Disgust Scale-Revised. To address the questionable psychometric properties of 
the DS, Olatunji and colleagues (2007) sought to provide a comprehensive assessment of 
the adequacy of the 32-item DS and its factor structure. To improve reliability, seven 
items were eliminated from the DS due to unacceptable lower bound item-to-total 
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correlations. Items in the sex domain were also eliminated due to a lack of evidence of 
face validity. The resulting three-domain scale, The Disgust Scale – Revised (DS-R) was 
shown to provide stronger internal consistencies and a more valid measure of disgust 
sensitivity in anxiety disorders.  
 The 27 items of the DS-R has a three-factor model consisting of core, animal-
reminder, and contamination disgust. This factor structure is widely recognized, and 
compared to previous two-factor models proposed by Rozin and Fallon (1987) did not 
include a contamination disgust factor and provided a superior fit to conceptualize 
disgust-related anxiety disorders. Further psychometric evaluations of the DS-R have 
found the measure to be a reliable index to establish Core, Animal Reminder, and 
Contamination disgust (van Overveld, de Jong, Peters & Schouten, 2011). 
 Core Disgust. Core disgust is believed to be the most primal form of disgust from 
which other forms of disgust have evolved (Rozin, Haidt, & McCauley, 2008).  This form 
of disgust has shaped how humans protect their body from distasting stimuli and has led 
to the expansion of a broader range of disgust (i.e., Animal-Reminder and Contamination 
disgust). The adaptive function of Core disgust is to protect the body from threat of 
illness or disease through oral incorporation. Core disgust serves as a “guardian of the 
body” ensuring unusual, noxious, or poisons substances do not enter the body (Rozin, 
Haidt, & McCauley, 2008). The Core disgust items on the DS-R incorporate the items 
from the death, body product, and hygiene DS subscales.  Disgust elicitors of the Core 
domain include seeing vomit, hearing mucus being cleared from one’s throat, seeing or 
stepping on small animals (i.e., cockroaches, earthworms, rats), drinking or eating food 
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that has been contaminated or spoiled, and discovering that someone you know does not 
have good hygiene.  
 Animal Reminder. The Animal-Reminder domain of disgust has been 
consistently found in evolutionary research on disgust (van Overveld, et al., 2011), and is 
said to have evolved from Core disgust as a defense against a fear of death present in all 
animals (Rozin, Haidt, & McCauley, 2008). Thus, this domain of disgust reflects a 
reminder of the animal origins of humans (Rozin et al., 2008). The Animal Reminder 
disgust domain on the DS-R includes items from the death and body envelope violations, 
and sympathetic subscales of the DS. The disgust elicitors for this disgust domain include 
viewing severed limbs or body part, touching or encountering dead animal or human 
bodies, or being near areas where death has occurred. Becker (1973) and Rozin (1987) 
have theorized that Animal Reminder disgust functions as a way to protect the human 
psyche from the certainty of death, to prevent exposure from contaminated fluids that 
may result from body envelope violations, and to ensure human differentiation from 
actions that may be immoral or unsanitary. 
 Contamination. While very similar to the Core disgust domain, Contamination 
disgust reactions are based perceived threats of the possible transmission of illness. The 
differences between Core and Contamination disgust from the individual’s cognitive 
connections made from the disgusting stimuli and transmission of illness. Where Core 
focuses more on inherently disgusting stimuli whose connections to contamination is 
direct (i.e., drinking spoiled milk will likely make you sick), Contamination disgust 
requires a context of contact or exposure to stimuli that have been contaminated by 
another sourced (i.e., borrowing a book from someone who had the flu while reading it). 
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This domain consists of eight items from the hygiene, sympathetic magic, and two 
additional items (walking through a graveyard, and smelling urine) from the DS.  Items 
from this domain consist of disgust elictors such as drinking from the same container that 
someone else has, inflating an unused condom with your mouth, and touching a toilet 
seat.  
 Due to the strong overlap between domain definitions and the necessity to provide 
context for disgust elicitors, Contamination disgust has shown the weakest reliability 
among the three domains. And the abstract nature of this domain has made it hard to 
research, because one must construct a context behind Contamination disgust elicitors to 
occur. However, recent research has stated that the three factor model is the best fit for 
conceptualizing disgust, and Contamination disgust is a salient component of disgust 
sensitivity (van Overveld et al. 2011). 
Domain Specificity 
 There is a paucity of research on the role of disgust in anxiety disorders compared 
to other emotions (i.e., fear), but the concept of domain specificity has garnered empirical 
support for disgust-related anxiety disorders. Domain specificity of disgust refers to 
particular domains of disgust (Core, Animal Reminder, or Contamination) being closely 
related to symptoms of specific anxiety disorders (Olatunji et al., 2008). Thus, levels of 
disgust sensitivity for a given domain of disgust would be higher for a certain anxiety 
disorder compared to others. If domain specificity does not exist, then 1) disgust scores 
will be similar among clinical and nonclinical individuals, or 2) that individuals with 
anxiety disorders will simply have higher overall disgust scores than nonclinical patients. 
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Research in the past ten years has pointed to domain sensitivity among BII, animal 
phobia, and contamination-related OCD (Olatunji & McKay, 2009). 
 Koch, O’Neill, Sawchuk, and Connolly (2002) found individuals with BII phobia 
report higher levels Animal Reminder disgust compared to individuals without BII 
phobia.  Differences were not found between clinical and nonclinical groups on Core and 
Contamination domains of disgust (based on original DS items that relate to the Core and 
Contamination domains on the DS-R). These results are consistent with a study by de 
Jong and Merckelbach (1998), who also found that BII was related to Animal Reminder 
disgust. de Jong and Merckelbach (1998) also found that individuals with spider fear 
scored significantly higher on the animal domain of the DS (currently part of the Core 
domain of DS-R). In research, individuals with spider phobia and BII phobia have 
consistently scored higher in Core and Animal Reminder disgust sensitivity, respectively 
(Bianchi, 2012).  These studies show that individuals with anxiety disorders who avoid 
disgust elicitors within that domain (i.e., aversion of Core disgust elicitors such as spiders 
for individuals with spider phobia) tend to score higher in disgust sensitivity for that 
domain than would individuals with other anxiety disorders. 
 The most comprehensive investigation of disgust sensitivity as it relates to anxiety 
disorders was done by Olatunji and colleagues (2008). The researchers completed a series 
of studies to determine the differences between DS-R scores on each domain of disgust 
and measures of anxiety disorder symptoms, physiological responses, and behavioral 
avoidance. After collecting data on levels of anxiety related to animal phobia, BII phobia, 
and OCD symptoms, Olatunji and colleagues (2008) found that higher levels of Animal 
Reminder disgust uniquely predicted BII symptoms (i.e., aversion to body mutilation, 
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injuries, and death), higher levels of contamination disgust uniquely predicted animal 
fears and contamination fear observed in OCD, and higher core disgust levels uniquely 
predicted animal phobia symptoms. The unique contribution to anxiety symptoms of each 
domain of disgust illustrates that there are specific contributions of different types of 
disgust and anxiety disorder etiology. 
 Physiological correlates of the three domains of disgust were also found.  The 
researchers had participants complete the DS-R and collected physiological data while 
participants watched video clips that were domain specific (a person vomiting into a 
toilet and core, blood draw for animal-reminder).  They found that exposure to the core 
disgust video was associated with higher core and contamination levels and in turn were 
related to greater facial tension and elevated heart rate. This is consistent with the theory 
that core disgust is the guardian of the mouth (Rozin & Fallon, 1987). Exposure to the 
blood draw video was associated with animal reminder disgust and correlated with lower 
heart rate. Though it is unclear why animal reminder disgust is associated with this 
response, one theory is that animal reminder disgust serves as a way to decrease 
autonomic arousal and blood flow to inhibit further blood loss in body envelope 
violations (Olatunji et al., 2008). 
 Each domain also appears to have behavioral correlates (Olatunji et al., 2008). 
After having students complete the DS-R, Olatunji and colleagues had participants watch 
a movie related to emotions.  They had participants watch three clips (approximately 90 
seconds long) featuring core, animal reminder, and contamination disgust elicitors. 
Following the videos, the participants were asked to complete a disgusting avoidance task 
that consisted of three steps 1) taking a grape out of a cup, 2) chew the grape and spit it 
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back into the cup, and 3) drink the contents of the cup. At the end, participants were 
asked to report how much they avoided each video, and whether they completed the task 
or not.  The results showed that levels of each domain (core, animal reminder, and 
contamination) significantly predicted visual avoidance of the corresponding video clip.  
Also, core disgust sensitivity was found to be the only predictor of behavioral avoidance 
of the grape task (domain congruent). Thus, scoring high on the sensitivity to avoid 
unsightly foods was related to avoidance of the task corresponding to incorporating an 
unsightly grape. However, because each video was shown consecutively and the 
avoidance task followed the viewing of each video, one must consider habituation of 
disgust leading to avoidance.  That is, were there additive effects of disgust on avoidance, 
or was it domain specificity of the task and video that lead to behavioral avoidance? 
 Mills (2010) in a replication of Olatunji and colleagues’ (2008) study, attempted 
to address the problem of habituation found in the previous study. Mills and his research 
team investigated whether participants would avoid a the grape task more often if they 
had just watched a disgusting video and if the video was related to core disgust (domain 
congruent to the task) compared to a video of an animal reminder disgust elicitor (domain 
incongruent to the task). Due to the possibility that common factors may motivate 
behavioral tendencies on the core and contamination domains, Mills only focused on 
differences between behavioral avoidance of the core and animal-reminder domains. 
Before being asked to do the grape task, the participants were randomly chosen to watch 
core disgust, animal reminder disgust, or a neutral video clip. The results found that the 
rate of avoidance was similar across all groups, as well as no difference in self-reported 
disgust on the behavioral task. This suggests that there are no discernible behavioral 
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differences among domains, and video priming of certain domains of disgust did not 
affect avoidance or disgust.   
 However, like Olatunji and colleagues’ (2008) there were research limitations that 
may have led to inconclusive results regarding domain specificity. Mills (2010) posited 
that he may have introduced demand characteristics into the study. The participants were 
asked to complete the task in a one-on-one setting without a means to confidentially 
complete the task. Thus, Mills and his research team may have inadvertently caused 
participants to behave in ways that the research team wanted the participants to (i.e., 
completing the task regardless of group).  While the problem of habituation was 
addressed, this problem was replaced with demand characteristics.  Therefore the 
question of whether domain specific behavioral avoidance is related to domain specific 
levels of trait disgust sensitivity remains. 
 Background. To date, the connections between avoidance and trait disgust 
sensitivity have not been fully investigated. This study attempts to address the limitations 
of Mills’ (2010) study in an attempt to understand behavioral avoidance and domain 
specific of disgust. Thus, the current study is a replication of Olatunji and colleagues’ 
(2008) behavioral correlates study with modifications to the procedures that Mills (2010) 
designed.  Like Mills’ (2010) study the current study attempted to examine the effect of 
evoking disgust on behavioral avoidance of a disgusting task, then to determine 
differences between domains on task avoidance. Just as in Mills’ (2010) study, 
participants will be asked to watch a core disgust, animal reminder disgust, or a netural 
video prior to completing the grape task introduced by Olatunji and colleagues (2008).  
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 Mills (2010) found that all three groups found the grape task to not be a potent 
disgust elicitor, and worried that the task was not a good representative of the core 
disgust domain. To determine that the grape task was an adequate measure of core 
disgust avoidance, 343 participants were surveyed asking level of disgust among various 
disgust elicitors (i.e., bread, water, jello, saltine cracker, green beans, grapes, ice cream). 
For each disgust elicitor, the participants were told that they would have to chew, spit 
into a cup, and eat the questioned disgust elictor. They were told to rate levels of disgust 
from 0 (not disgusting at all) to 8 (extremely disgusting). It was determined that a grape 
would provide the most behavioral variability among the participants. Thus, Mills’ 
(2010) worries about floor and ceiling effects were addressed by determining the task to 
be moderately disgusting. In other words, the grape task was found not to be so 
disgusting that it would be avoided by most, yet not tame enough that everyone would 
complete the task. It just so happened, that after further examination the grape task would 
be adequate enough. 
 Another limitation to Mills’ (2010) study was the possible introduction of demand 
characteristics. The current study will utilize procedures that will attempt to eliminate the 
pressure to complete the task and make it clear to the participants that the task can be 
completed confidentially. With research methodology that is sounder than Olatunji and 
colleagues (2008) and Mills (2010) this study will further examine differences in 
behavioral avoidance between the core and animal reminder disgust domains while 
addressing the limitations the previous studies. 
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CHAPTER II 
METHODS 
Participants 
 A total of 160 undergraduate students enrolled in psychology courses at a 
Midwestern university participated in this study, and were recruited through the 
university’s online research recruiting system.  The students received extra credit for their 
participation. In order to avoid selection bias, the description of the study made no 
mention of disgust.  In recruiting, the study was named “Reactions to Film clips,” and 
participants were informed that they would be viewing film clips and completing 
questionnaires. 
Materials 
 Emotion Questionnaire – State/Video/Task (EQ-S/EQ-V/EQ-T; Rottenberg, 
Ray, & Gross, 2007, modified by Mills, 2010).  This measure is a modified version of 
Rottenberg, Ray and Gross’ (2007) Emotion Questionnaire assessing emotional 
elicitation of film clips. The original questionnaire (Emotion Questionnaire – Video; EQ-
V) was used in Mills’ (2010) and the current study to assess emotional elictaiton of the 
film clip that each group will watch. Mill (2010) modified the questionnaire to measure 
state emotion (EQ-S) and the emotions elicited during the behavioral avoidance task (EQ-
T). This will allow the assessment of emotions elicited by the video and the task. 
 Adaptations of the questionnaire include the following: instead of asking 
participants to rate, “How you felt while watching the film,” they were asked to rate, “ 
How you feel at this moment” or, “How you felt during the second part of the grape 
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task.” The question of whether the participant had viewed the film before on the EQ-V 
was dropped for the EQ-S and EQ-T. A question asking whether the participant felt that 
the behavioral task was similar to the video was added to the EQ-T. The EQ-V can be 
found in appendix A, and the modified questionnaires can be found in Appendix B (EQ-
S) and Appendix C (EQ-T). 
 State-Trait Anxiety Inventory, Trait Version (STAI; Spielberger, Gorsuch, 
Luschene, Vagg, & Jacobs, 1983). STAI is a questionnaire used to measure state 
(current and unstable) and trait (average and stable) anxiety. It consists of 40-items, but 
only 20-items relating to trait anxiety were used, because state emotions were assessed 
using the EQ-S.  The STAI scores items on a 4 point Likert scale from 1 (Almost Never) 
to 4 (Almost Always) with higher scores indicating greater anxiety. Example items 
include “I am content” “I have disturbing thoughts,” and “I worry too much over 
something that really doesn’t matter.” The interaction of disgust and anxiety sensitivities 
continue to be implicated with one another (see a review in Davey, 2011), therefore the 
STAI was used to determine if there were any significant group differences in trait 
anxiety between groups that could affect the level of disgust reported and be a causal 
factor in behavioral avoidance. 
 Disgust Scale – Revised (DS-R; Olatunji et al., 2007). The DS-R was the 
primary measure of overall disgust sensitivity. The factor structure has consistently 
shown to be stronger and more adequate measure of disgust-related anxiety than the DS 
(van Overveld et al., 2007). Thus, the revisions to the original DS have been shown to 
improve its psychometric features, and the authors of the original DS have suggested use 
of the DS-R to assess disgust sensitivity in anxiety disorders. 
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 The DS-R is a 27-item measure of disgust sensitivity across the disgust domains 
of core, animal-reminder, and contamination disgust. The items are assess expected levels 
of disgust to disgust elicitors on a 5-point Likert Scale from 0 (Strongly/Disagree/Very 
Untrue About Me/ Not Disgusting at All) to 4 (Strongly Agree/Very True About 
Me/Extremely Disgusting). There are two sections to the DS-R. Items 1-14 ask how 
much an individual agrees with the following statements, or how true it is about the 
individual regarding various disgust elicitors (e.g., “If I see vomit, it makes me sick to my 
stomach,” “It would bother me to be in a science class, and to see a human hand 
preserved in a jar).  Items 15-27 inquire about how disgusting an individual would find a 
certain experience (e.g., “When you are walking through a tunnel under a railroad track, 
you smell urine,” “You take  a sip of soda, and you realize that you drank from the glass 
that an acquaintance of yours had been drinking from”).  
 John Haidt collected normative data from 34,442 participants on YourMorals.com 
who completed the DS-R (Haidt, 2011, May 30).  He found that mean DS-R score for 
each item are 1.67 (SD=.61), mean core subscale item scores of 1.93 (SD=.67), mean 
animal reminder subscale item scores of 1.64 (SD=.80), and mean contamination subscale 
item scores of 1.07 (SD=.72). 
 As van Overveld and colleagues (2011) demonstrated, the psychometrics of the 
DS-R are sound. The internal consistency of this measure is strong (α=.87). The 
reliabilities for the  core (α=.80) and animal reminder (α=.82) subscales are also strong, 
while the reliability of the contamination subscale (α=.71) is adequate. The DS-R has 
shown adequate content validity and the domains have been shown to measure different 
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constructs.  There is also moderate convergent validity with the Disgust Propensity and 
Sensitivity Scale-Revised (DPSS-R) and the Disgust Emotion Scale (DES).  
 Disgust-Eliciting Stimulus Videos. The videos used for this study were 
empirically validated by Rottenberg and colleagues (2007) and elicit high levels of 
disgust.  In order to gain neutral control the researchers also validated a neutral film clip 
that elicited no emotions.  The two videos that Rottenberg and colleagues (2007) 
suggested are within the domains of core and animal reminder disgust. These two disgust 
videos, as well as the neutral video, were used for this study. 
 The core disgust video was a clip from the movie Pink Flamingos includes an 
actress dressed like a clown watching a dog defecate on the ground.  When the dog is 
finished, the actress bends down, picks up the dog feces, and puts it in her mouth. She 
chews the dog feces while smiling and attempting not to vomit. The animal reminder 
video includes various stages of a leg amputation. The video consists of incisions being 
made, blood being visable, the removal of skin, and ends with the cutting through muscle 
and bone. The neutral video is a simple screen saver shown for a minute.  The screen 
savor consists of various colored rods appearing and disappearing on a black background. 
Each video did not include sound. Appendix D has still images from each video. 
 Video Avoidance. Behavioral avoidance on the video clips was collected by 
researcher observation. From a vantage that would not be obvious to the participant 
(greater than four feet away, from the side), the researcher was to appear busy as they 
observed whether the participant averted their gaze or turned their head from the video.  
Observers were asked to estimate how much of the video the participants had visually 
avoided (broken into increments of 25%).  These estimations were recorded on the 
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Researcher Observation Form (see Appendix E). The estimated time of avoidance was 
used for anaylsis of visual avoidance between groups. 
 Behavioral Avoidance Task: Grape Task (Olatunji, Haidt, McKay, & David, 
2008; Mills, 2010). The current study uses a modified form from Mills (2010) adapted 
from Olatunji and colleagues (2008) to assess behavioral avoidance and correlates of the 
three disgust domains. The grape task consisted of two steps. The first step consisted of 
instructing the participant to chew a grape without swallowing it, and spit it into an 
opaque plastic cup. In the second step, participants were instructed to eat the contents of 
the cup at their discretion. Demand characteristics found in Mills’ (2010) study addressed 
by allowing the participants to anonymously place the opaque cup, with or without the 
grape in it, into a box containing other cups that had appeared to be used (half the cups 
with a squished grape, the other half empty) to ensure anonymity. The cup that the 
particpants used was marked on the bottom so that the researcher would know which cup 
the participant had used. The first step took place prior to viewing a film clip, and step 
two was completed immediately following viewing a clip. Before each step, partcipants 
were instructed that they could stop the task at any time or chose to not complete the task 
by placing the cup anonymously into the box during step two. 
 Researcher Observation Form. Research assistants were asked to observe 
participants while they were in the lab. First, the researchers would record whether the 
participant completed or did not complete/stopped the first part of the grape task.  
Following step two of the grape task, researchers also recorded whether they completed 
or did not complete/stopped the second part of the grape task. Lastly, using a stopwatch, 
researchers would discretely record how long it took for the participant to complete the 
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task and place the cup into the anonymity box or how long it took them to refuse and 
place the cup into the box. The Reseracher Observation Form can be found in Appendix 
E. 
Procedure 
 Before arriving in the lab, participants were randomly assigned to one of three 
groups: Domain-Congruent (core disgust video, core disgust task), Domain-Incongruent 
(animal reminder disgust video, core disgut task), and Neutral (neutral video, core digust 
task).  The only aspect that was different between groups was which video stimulus they 
watched. 
 Participants were brought into the Anxiety and Phobia Research Laboraty 
individually. Participants completed questionnaires and watched the videos on a 
computer. A research assistant was present at all times throughout the study to obtain 
informed consent, read directions and answer questions, and debrief the participant when 
the study was completed. 
 Questionnaire Packet 1. The first questionnaire packet was completed online 
through SONA Systems in the research lab, and contained a form collecting demographic 
data (Appendix F), the EQ-S, STAI (Trait Anxiety Portion), and the DS-R. The purpose 
of Questionnaire Packet 1 was to gather demographic information, assess current 
emotions (to contrast with post-video and post-task emotions), and assess their trait 
disgust sensitivity and trait anxiety. 
 Grape Task, Step 1. After completing the first set of questionnaires, participants 
were informed by the researchers that they had an optional task to complete. The 
participants were then asked to complete the first step of the grape task (chew and spit the 
25 
 
grape into the cup). The cup was then set aside (but in view of the participants, contents 
not showing) until step two of the grape task.  The researchers told the participants that 
they could refuse/stop the task at any time. 
 Disgust Exposure. The participants were then informed that they were going to 
watch a short film clip. The participants were told that they could cover their eyes or look 
away if they wish, and would later be asked a few questions about their reaction to the 
clip. 
 The Domain-Congruent group was shown the video that contained the disgust 
elicitor that was in the same disgust domain as the grape task (core disgust). This group 
was assigned to watch the video of the woman eating dog feces.  The Domain-
Incongruent group was shown the animal reminder  elictor video (leg amputation). The 
Neutral group was shown the neutral elicitor video (screen saver). Researchers discretly 
observed the participants that were viewing the videos to estimate visual avoidance from 
a vantage point to the side of the participant more than four feet away. Avoidance was 
determined by an estimate of how much of the video the participant averted their gaze 
(looking to the side or turning their head) or closed their eyes while the video was 
playing. 
 Grape Task, Step 2. After the video had stopped, the researchers immediately 
asked the particpants to complete another task.  The participants were asked to eat the 
contents of the cup (using the spoon provided if they wish).  Participants were told that 
the researcher would step away, and allow the participants to complete the task.  The 
researchers stated that, “When you have swallowed the grape, please set the cup 
anonymously in the [anonymity] box. Remember, this task is completely optional. 
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Whatever you decide to do let me know when you have placed the cup into the box.” 
During this time, the researchers would step out of the area of the computer, turn away, 
and discretely record how long it took for the participant to say that they had placed the 
cup into the box. 
 Questionnaire Packet 2. Following the step two of the grape task, participants 
were asked to complete Questionnaire Packet 2 online through SONA Systems. This 
packet consisted of the EQ-V and EQ-T, assessing levels of various emotions that the 
participant felt during the video and during the grape task.  The end of the EQ-T asked to 
what degree they felt that the video they had watched and the task they had completed 
were related. After the questionnaires were complete, the participants were debriefed, 
thanked for their time, and free to leave. Once the participants left, the researchers 
checked to see if the participant had completed the task by seeing if the grape was 
missing from the participant’s marked cup in the anonymity box. Completion or refusal 
on steps one and two, time it took to complete step two, and estimated time of video 
avoidance was recorded on the Researcher Observation Form. 
Hypotheses 
 Hypothesis 1: Behavioral Avoidance on Grape Task. It was hypothesized that 
the Domain-Congruent group would have the highest rates of avoidance on the grape task 
due to the task being domain specific to core disgust. Due to the experience of viewing 
disgusting video (animal-reminder) it was also hypothesized that the Domain-
Incongruent group will have higher rates of avoidance than the Neutral group. 
 Hypothesis 2: Self-Reported Disgust on Grape Task.  As with the previous 
hypothesis, it was expected that Domain-Congruent participants would rate the grape task 
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more disgusting on the EQ-T than the Domain-Incongruent or Neutral groups.  Again, 
because the Domain-Incongruent group was also being exposed to a disgusting video, it 
is believed that this group would rate the grape task as more disgusting than the Neutral 
group. The expectation is that the Neutral group will have the lowest self-reported 
disgust. 
 Hypothesis 3: Latency to Complete Grape Task. The final hypothesis was 
those who rated the grape task as highly disgusting on the EQ-T would either be in the 
quickest 33% or the slowest 33% to complete the task (by placing the cup anonymously 
in the box or by saying “Stop”). Therefore, participants who found the task most 
disgusting would quickly eat the grape to get the task over with (quick responder), refuse 
to complete the task quickly (quick responder), or would take time to contemplate 
completing the task (long responder).  It was expected that the group of participants who 
fell in the middle responder group would rate the task the least disgusting. 
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CHAPTER III 
RESULTS 
 Sample Characteristics & Questionnaire Packets. To meet criteria to be 
considered for data analysis, the participants were required to complete step one of the 
behavioral task or not have seen the video clip that they viewed before. Eight participants 
were dropped from analysis, with six participants being unable to complete step one and 
two had viewed the clip that they were exposed to previously. Thus, 152 participants 
were considered for analysis. After the participants were dropped, the Domain-Congruent 
group consisted of 53 participants, Domain-Incongruent group consisted of 50 
participants, and the Neutral group consisted of 49 participants. A summary of 
demographic information of this sample is found in Table 1.  
  The total DS-R score mean was 53.23 (from observed scores of 24-86, and a 
possible 0-100).  An independent samples t-test determined that there were significant 
differences in DS-R total scores between participants who avoided the grape task 
(M=57.37, SD=11.63) and those that did not avoid the task (M=50.02, SD= 12.15), 
t=3.14, p<.01.  These results are consistent with past studies looking at behavioral 
avoidance and disgust (Connolly et. al, 2009; Mills, 2010). Sample DS-R and STAI 
means are found in Table 2. 
 A between-groups ANOVA and Tukey’s post-hoc analyses determined that there 
were significant differences between the Domain-Congruent, Domain-Incongruent, and 
Neutral groups on a variety of emotions on the EQ-V. These significant differences are 
found in Table 3. Of note, there were significant differences in video disgust, such that 
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the core disgust video was rated more disgusting than the animal-reminder and neutral 
videos, and the animal-reminder video was rated as more disgusting than the neutral 
video. Other emotions that garnered significant differences were amusement, anger, 
confusion, embarrassment, joy, love, pride, shame, unhappiness, surprise, pleasantness, 
and unhappiness. These differences are found in Table 3.  
 Evidence for domain specificity can be found as well, as the Domain-Congruent 
group reported that the grape task reminded them of the task more than the Domain-
Incongruent and Neutral groups. Tukey’s post-hoc analysis found that the differences 
between all of the groups were significant. These findings suggest that the participants 
believe that the core video and core task are related and thus domain specific. The group 
differences for this analysis can also be found in Table 3. 
 Group differences in task emotion ratings on the EQ-T were also found. A 
between groups ANOVA and Tukey’s follow-up analyses determined that participants 
who watched the neutral video experienced significantly higher levels of happiness, joy, 
and love than the animal-reminder group during the task. Those who watched the neutral 
video and core disgust video also showed significantly higher levels of shame during the 
task than participants who watched the animal-reminder video. These differences are 
outlined in Table 4. 
 Hypothesis 1: Behavioral Avoidance. The first hypothesis stated that the 
Domain-Congruent group would have the highest rate of avoidance on the grape task, 
followed by the Domain-Incongruent group, and the Neutral group would have the least 
amount of avoidance. There is support for this hypothesis, as the results of a Chi-Square 
(group by step 2 completion) test indicates that there are significant differences in rates of 
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behavioral avoidance between groups, χ2 (2) = 6.24, p<.05. The Domain-Congruent 
group had the highest rate of avoidance, followed by the Domain-Incongruent group, and 
then the neutral group with the least amount of avoidance. There were no significant 
differences between the Domain-Incongruent group and the neutral group.  A visual 
representation of these differences is found in Figure 1. There were no significant 
differences between groups and visual avoidance to the video. 
 Hypothesis 2: Self-Reported Disgust on Grape Task. A one-way ANOVA 
found that there were significant differences between groups in self-reported task disgust, 
F (2, 149) =6.59, p<.01. Tukey’s post-hoc analysis determined that the Domain-
Congruent group (M=4.66, SD= 2.70) rated the task significantly more disgusting than 
both the Domain-Incongruent (M=3.06, SD=2.78) and Neutral groups (M=2.88, 
SD=2.75). These findings are consistent with the hypothesis. There were no significant 
differences between the Domain-Incongruent and Neutral groups. These findings are 
visually displayed in Figure 2. 
 Interestingly, a one-way ANOVA found that there were no significant differences 
between males (M=3.41, SD=3.08) and females (M=3.61, SD=2.78) in self-reported task 
disgust, F (1, 149) =0.12, p=n.s. This finding is not consistent with existing disgust 
literature that has shown that females tend to exhibit higher disgust sensitivity than males 
(Olatunji & Mckay, 2009). 
 Hypothesis 3: Latency of Step 2 on Grape Task. Participants were split into 
Quick (0 to 4.00 seconds), Medium (4.10 to 7.40 seconds), and Slow (7.50 seconds and 
longer) groups. Though the Slow responders (M=3.86, SD=2.81) rated the task most 
disgusting, followed by Medium (M=3.64, SD=2.63), and Slow responders the least 
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disgusting (M=3.21, SD=3.07), a 3 (latency group) by 1 (task disgust) ANOVA did not 
find significant differences between the groups, F (2, 148)= 0.71, p = n.s. 
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CHAPTER IV 
DISCUSSION 
 The purpose of the present study was to determine if priming nonclinical 
participants with different domain-related disgust videos would lead to differences in 
behavioral avoidance between the core and animal-reminder disgust domains, while 
accounting for the previous limitations of Olatunji and colleagues’ (2008) and Mills’ 
(2010) studies. This was accomplished by addressing possible habituation to disgust by 
designating experimental groups that viewed a disgust eliciting video that was either 
Domain-Congruent (core video, core task), Domain-Incongruent (animal-reminder video, 
core task), or Neutral. To ensure that there were no demand characteristics, the 
participants were reassured multiple times during the study that the grape task was 
optional, and that they could choose to stop the task at any time.  Whether the participants 
chose to complete the task or not, he/she was allowed to place the cup that may or may 
not contain a grape into a box of anonymity. The researchers gave the participants a 
uniquely numbered cup to perform the task, turned away from the participant, and had the 
participant place his/her cup into the box of anonymity full of other used and unused 
cups. Thus, the participant’s perception of the need to comply with the task was 
diminished as much as possible. Prior to completing the current study, it was determined 
that the grape task was indeed potent enough to yield enough variability in disgust 
responses. 
 After accounting for these limitations, it was determined that the Domain-
Congruent group (39.6%) had significantly higher rates of behavioral avoidance (p<.05) 
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on the grape task compared to the Domain-Incongruent (24.0%) and Neutral groups 
(18.4%). Thus, priming participants with a core disgust video would lead to greater rates 
of avoidance on a core disgust task. Significant group differences on self-reported disgust 
of the grape task were also found (p<.01), such that the Domain-Congruent group 
reported greater levels of disgust on the task than the Domain-Incongruent and Neutral 
groups.   This suggests evidence for domain specificity in the behaviors we may elicit 
when faced with disgusting stimuli. In particular, different rates of behavioral avoidance 
on the core task points to Rozin and Fallon’s (1987) theory that states core disgust serves 
as the guardian of the mouth, serving to protect humans from ingesting possible 
contaminating agents. In other words, this study provides evidence that suggests that 
there are different behavioral repertoires involved with specific domains of disgust 
consistent with previous research (Olatunji et al., 2008).   
 Most importantly, the findings of this study add to the extant disgust literature by 
demonstrating that priming individuals with potent disgust elicitors will have an effect on 
behavioral avoidance and experiences of disgust. This suggests that the mechanisms 
avoidance are related to distinct domains of disgust, such that a core-disgust prime leads 
to behavioral avoidance on a core-disgust task. These findings have clinical significance 
as well, and demonstrate that disgust should be considered in the exposure paradigm.  It 
may be appropriate for a clinician to target specific disgust-elicitors for clients with 
corresponding disgust-related avoidance.  
 Like Rozin, Haidt, and McCauley (2008) point out, we live in a disgusting world 
and may not recognize the dynamics of avoidance unless it is brought to an individual’s 
attention (i.e., light switches may not be inherently disgusting unless someone who had 
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just sneezed reaches for one).  As this study shows, individuals that had recognized or 
viewed images of disgusting stimuli elicited higher levels disgust. For individuals with 
small-animal phobias, BII phobias, and contamination-related OCD, creating treatments 
that focus on exposure to disgust-relevant stimuli, along with fear, may lead to decreased 
behavioral avoidance of these relevant stimuli. These treatments could include imaginal 
exposure of disgust-related stimuli that after habituation to disgusting stimuli may lead to 
decreases in behavioral avoidance of feared stimuli and anxiety. Thus, by understanding 
the role of disgust in anxiety disorders, clinicians can further conceptualize how 
behavioral avoidance is maintained. Future research should examine the clinical 
implications of including disgust in the exposure paradigm. For example, a study could 
utilize single-case design in determining how appropriate the use of systematic 
desensitization or imaginal exposure to disgust elicitors might lead to a decrease in 
anxiety for individuals who are not responding to typical fear-based exposure therapies. 
 Contrary to what was expected, significant differences between Quick, Medium, 
and Slow responders on the task were not found on task-related disgust. In other words, 
there was a lack of variability between these groups in who found the act of swallowing a 
previously chewed grape disgusting. This suggests that latency to completing a task does 
not have an effect on how disgusting people perceive the task to be.  
 This study also serves as a testament to replication and systematic research in 
psychology. In an attempt to better understand the behavioral correlates of different 
disgust domains, this study controlled aspects of habituation and demand characters that 
were found to be limitations in previous studies of disgust elicitors. In other words, by 
addressing the limitations of the previous study (Mills, 2010), this modification study 
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found support for the original study that investigated behavioral correlates of disgust 
domains (Olatunji et al., 2008).  Replication has been seen as a “must” for scientific 
advancement of psychology (Yehuda & Irit, 1990), and this study has given more validity 
to the theory that different disgust domains elicit different rates of behavioral avoidance 
and levels of disgust related to a domain specific task. 
Limitations/Future Directions 
 The aim of this study was to determine the relationship of priming disgust-related 
videos on behavioral avoidance. However, compared to Olatunji and colleagues (2008), 
this study was not attempting to determine if DS-R scores (total or domain-specific) 
predicted grape task avoidance. Also, though the findings of this study showed 
significantly higher rates of avoidance for the Domain-Congruent group (39.6%), 
Olatunji and colleagues reported that nearly 60% of his participants avoided the task. 
While this study was conducted in a lab with one participant completing the study at a 
time, Olatunji and colleagues used an introductory psychology class room with 89 
students watching the disgust-eliciting videos at the same time.  Therefore, the elevated 
rates of avoidance reported in Olatunji et al. (2008) could be due to the Social Contagion 
Theory (Jones & Jones, 1995). This theory states that emotions expressed (i.e., joy, 
sadness, disgust) are amplified in the presence of others. Thus, the variability in 
behavioral avoidance could be due to the fact that participants in this study were not in 
the presence of others while viewing the disgust-related video. Future studies should 
address the differences that may be found in behavioral avoidance as it relates to disgust 
and the presence of other people viewing disgusting stimuli or completing disgusting 
tasks.  
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 Compared to Mills’ (2010) study, this study did not utilize as rigorous video 
avoidance or latency recording. Mills (2010) used a webcam to record the participants 
while they watched the priming video. In order to not be as invasive, this study simply 
utilized researcher observation done from a distance that would not be noticeable to the 
participant. This certainly would have resulted in a less accurate measure of visual 
avoidance to the video. Determining whether greater levels of disgust or disgust 
sensitivity could potentially lead to video avoidance should be evaluated with further 
research. 
 Mills (2010) also found those who completed the second part of the grape task 
quickest rated the task to be most disgusting. The current study found no significant 
differences in disgust ratings and latency to complete the second part of the grape task. 
This could be due to how latency to complete the task was measured. Mills (2010) 
objectively measured latency by starting a timer and viewing when the participant picked 
up the cup with a grape in it and stopping the timer when the participant set it back down 
or said, “Stop.” The current study measured latency by starting a timer when the 
participant picked up the cup with a grape in it, turned away from the participant to let 
them decide whether they wanted to complete the task, and stopped the timer when 
participant had stated that they had placed the cup into the box of anonymity or said, 
“Stop.” Thus, latency to the task was less objective, relying on the participant to notify 
the researcher that they had completed the task to stop the timer. These experimental 
differences could have attributed to the lack of similar findings between the two studies. 
 Future research should also attempt to replicate these findings across other 
domains. For instance, one could determine whether priming participants with an animal-
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reminder video (e.g. viewing an amputation) could affect behavioral avoidance on an 
animal-reminder task (e.g. an animal dissection). This would further validate previous 
literature that has found behavioral avoidance on a disgusting task is domain specific. Not 
only replicating these findings, further research should evaluate cognitive and 
physiological factors that are related to different types of disgust elicitors related to 
specific domains.  
 Finally, a major limitation to consider was that this was a convenience sample 
consisting of undergraduate students that were mostly female, Caucasian, and either 
juniors or seniors. Future studies could attempt to recruit more diverse samples. In 
particular, researchers should focus on clinical BII, animal phobia, or contamination-
related OCD samples to determine whether generalized heighted disgust sensitivity leads 
to avoidance or whether it is disgust sensitivity related to core, animal-reminder, or 
contamination that is leading to behavioral avoidance of disgusting stimuli. 
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Table 1 
 
Sample Demographics 
  N (%) 
Gender  
 Male 34 (22.4%) 
 Female 118 (77.6%) 
Ethnicity  
 Caucasian 120 (78.9%) 
 African American 13 (8.6%) 
 Other 11 (7.2%) 
 Asian American 4 (2.6%) 
 Latino/a 2 (1.3%) 
Year in School  
 Freshman 15 (9.9%) 
 Sophomore 27 (17.8%) 
 Junior 48 (31.6%) 
 Senior 58 (38.2%) 
 Graduate Student 3 (2.0%) 
Note. N=152 
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Table 2 
 
Demographics, EQ-S, STAI , and DS-R Means 
  _____Range_____ 
 Mean (SD) Observed Possible 
Age 21.80 (3.90) 18 - 45 N/A 
Psychology Courses 
Taken 
5.48 (4.41)  0 – 18 N/A 
DS-R Total Score 52.34 (12.36) 24 – 86 0 - 100 
       Core 25.22 (6.25) 9 - 40 0 – 48 
       Animal Reminder 16.81 (5.29) 4 – 30 0 – 32 
       Contamination 6.39 (3.36) 0 – 15 0 - 20 
STAI Trait Score 47.02 (4.07) 37 – 60 20 - 80 
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Table 3 
 
Group Differences in Video Emotion Ratings 
 ________Mean Rating (SD)________ 
 Core AR Neutral 
Disgust*** 6.68 (1.57)
a
 4.62 (2.53)
b
 1.06 (1.84)
c
 
Embarrassment*** 2.17 (2.18)
a
 0.36 (1.05)
b
 0.78 (1.39)
b
 
Happiness*** 1.55 (1.78)
b
 0.74 (1.35)
b
 2.59 (2.20)
a
 
Shame*** 1.40 (1.69)
a
 0.34 (0.96)
b
 0.31 (0.71)
b
 
Surprise*** 6.13 (2.11)
a
 3.44 (2.15)
b
 3.24 (2.29)
b
 
Pride*** 0.77 (1.60)
b
 0.28 (0.73)
b
 1.49 (1.88)
a
 
Love*** 0.53 (1.40)
b
 0.06 (0.24)
b
 1.35 (1.81)
a
 
Pleasantness*** 1.49 (1.56)b 2.20 (1.83)
b
 3.80 (2.30)
a
 
Joy*** 1.15 (1.82)
b
 0.46 (1.21)
b
 2.16 (2.22)
a
 
Task remind you of 
the video?*** 
3.98 (2.80)
a
 1.88 (2.25)
b
 0.57 (1.47)
c
 
Unhappiness** 2.38 (2.39)
a
 2.16 (2.36)
a
 0.88 (1.54)
b
 
Amusement** 3.06 (2.61)
a
 1.84 (2.34)
b
 3.29 (2.53)
a
 
Anger* 1.15 (2.21)
a
 0.35 (1.03)
b
 0.65 (1.35) 
Confusion* 4.94 (2.58)
a
 3.46 (2.38)
b
 4.43 (2.61) 
Note. N=53 for Core, N=50 for Animal-Reminder, and N=49 for Neutral groups. For 
each emotion, the superscripted letter denotes a significant difference in values for that 
emotion. 
a 
is a value significantly higher than 
b
. 
b
 is significantly higher than 
c
. A value 
that does not have a superscript letter next to it does is not significantly different than any 
other values for that emotion. *p<.05. **p<.01. ***p<.001. 
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Table 4 
 
Group Differences in Task Emotion Ratings 
 ________Mean Rating (SD)________ 
 Core AR Neutral 
Disgust** 4.66 (2.70)
a
 3.06 (2.78)
b
 2.88 (2.75)
b
 
Happiness** 1.75 (2.08) 1.12 (1.87)
b
 2.49 (2.27)
a
 
Joy** 1.13 (1.89) 0.53 (1.26)
b
 1.71 (2.14)
a
 
Love*** 0.43 (1.20) 0.00 (0.00)
b
 0.98 (1.64)
a
 
Shame* 1.45 (1.91)
a
 0.65 (1.38)
b
 1.35 (1.74)
a
 
Note. N=53 for Core, N=50 for Animal-Reminder, and N=49 for Neutral groups. For 
each emotion, the superscripted letter denotes a significant difference in values for that 
emotion. 
a 
is a value significantly higher than 
b
. A value that does not have a superscript 
letter next to it does is not significantly different than any other values for that emotion. 
*p<.05. **p<.01. ***p<.001. 
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Figure 1. Percentage of avoidance on the second step of the grape task. a and b 
superscripts indicate significant group differences. Significant differences were found 
between the Domain-Congruent and the Domain-Incongruent groups in rates of 
avoidance of step 2 of the grape task. Significant differences in rates of responding were 
also found between the Domain-Congruent and the Neutral groups. There were no 
significant differences in rates of avoidance between the Domain-Incongruent and 
Neutral groups.  
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Figure 2. Group differences in self-reported task disgust. a and b superscripts indicate 
significant group differences. The Domain-Congruent group reported significantly higher 
levels of disgust on the task than both the Domain-Incongruent and Neutral groups. There 
were no significant differences between the Domain-Incongruent and Neutral groups.  
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Appendix A 
Emotion Questionnaire – Video (EQ-V; Rottenberg et al., 2007) 
The following questions refer to how you felt while watching the film. 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
not at 
all/ 
none 
   
somewhat/ 
some    
extremely/  
a great deal 
 
Using the scale above, please indicate the greatest amount of EACH emotion 
you experienced while watching the film. 
 
_______  amusement  _______  embarrassment  _______  love 
_______  anger  _______  fear    _______  pride 
_______  anxiety  _______  guilt    _______  sadness 
_______  confusion  _______  happiness   _______  shame 
_______  contempt  _______  interest   _______  surprise 
_______  disgust  _______  joy    _______  unhappiness  
 
Did you feel any other emotion during the film?     No  Yes 
 If so, what was the emotion? ________________________ 
 How much of the emotion did you feel? ______ 
 
Please use the following pleasantness scale to rate the feelings you had during 
the film. Circle your answer.  
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
unpleasant        pleasant 
 
Have you seen this film before?    No      Yes 
 
How much of the film did you watch? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
none 
of the 
film 
   half of 
the film 
   all of 
the film 
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Appendix B 
 
Emotion Questionnaire – State  
(Based on Rottenberg et al., 2007; modified by Mills, 2010) 
The following questions refer to how you feel right now. 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
not at 
all/ 
none 
  somewhat/ some  
extremely/  
a great deal 
 
Using the scale above, please indicate the greatest amount of EACH emotion you are 
experiencing at this moment. 
 
_______  amusement  _______  embarrassment  _______  love 
________anger  _______  fear    _______  pride 
_______  anxiety  _______  guilt    _______  sadness 
_______  confusion  _______  happiness   _______  shame 
_______  contempt  _______  interest   _______  surprise 
_______  disgust  _______  joy    _______  unhappiness  
 
 
Do you feel any other emotion at the moment?     No  Yes 
 If so, what is the emotion? ________________________ 
 How much of the emotion do you feel? ______ 
 
Please use the following pleasantness scale to rate the feelings you have right now. 
Circle your answer.  
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
unpleasant        pleasant 
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Appendix C 
Emotion Questionnaire – Task  
(Based on Rottenberg et al., 2007; modified by Mills, 2010) 
The following questions refer to how you felt during the task. 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
not at all/ 
none    
somewhat/ 
some   
extremely/  
a great deal 
 
Using the scale above, please indicate the greatest amount of EACH emotion 
you experienced during the task. 
 
_______  amusement  _______  embarrassment  _______  love 
_______  anger  _______  fear    _______  pride 
_______  anxiety  _______  guilt    _______  sadness 
_______  confusion  _______  happiness   _______  shame 
_______  contempt  _______  interest   _______  surprise 
_______  disgust  _______  joy    _______  unhappiness  
 
Did you feel any other emotion during the task?     No  Yes 
 If so, what was the emotion? ________________________ 
 How much of the emotion did you feel? ______ 
 
Please use the following pleasantness scale to rate the feelings you had during 
the task. Circle your answer.  
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
unpleasant        pleasant 
 
How much did the task remind you of what you saw in the film? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
not at all           some-what   extremely / 
a great deal 
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Appendix D 
Images from Each Film 
Domain Congruent Group (Core Disgust) - Pink Flamingos, “Dog Scene” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Domain-Incongruent Group (Animal Reminder Disgust) - Leg Amputation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Neutral Group – Sticks Screensaver 
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Appendix E 
Researcher Observation Form 
Grape Task  
 Step 1 (Chew & Spit) Step 2 (Eat contents) 
Task completion* (Yes/No) 
 
 
 
 
Time to complete task (seconds)  
 
 
 
 
Make sure they do not start task before you tell them “begin.” Start the stopwatch as you say 
“begin” and stop when they hand you the cup or say “stop.” 
 
*  Task completion definitions  
Step 1 
 Yes: Chewed up grape is now in the cup 
 No:  They say “stop” at any point or swallow grape 
 
Step 2 
 Yes: They put cup contents into mouth, swallow, and set the empty cup down 
 No: They say “stop” at any point, they do not attempt to put contents in their mouth,  
they spit grape back into cup before swallowing 
 
 
 
 
Video Task 
 
Right after participant finishes video: 
What is your best estimation about how much of the clip they AVOIDED/DID NOT WATCH? 
Circle an option.  
 
0%  25%  50%  75%  100% 
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Appendix F 
Demographic Data Questionnaire 
 
 
1. Gender:  Male  Female 
 
2. Age: ______________ 
 
3. Are you a citizen of the United States?   
□ Yes 
□ No 
 
4. Ethnicity:   
□ Caucasian    
□ Latino/a    
□ African American      
□ Asian American     
□ Indian American      
□ Other (please specify) 
 
5. Year in School:  
□ Freshman  
□ Sophomore    
□ Junior  
□ Senior   
□ Graduate Student 
 
6. Major(s):________________________________________________________ 
 
7. Minor(s):________________________________________________________ 
 
8. Number of psychology courses taken (estimate):_________________________ 
 
